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HOLISTIC SOCIAL CAUSATION AND EXPLANATION

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I INTRODUCTION

It has been regarded as a problem whether there can be genuine, irreducible causation in the social sciences. By such causation I mean causation that does not reduce to individual level causation. There is a parallel and related problem concerning psychological causation: Is there genuine, irreducible mental causation or is all causation purely physical in its nature? In this paper I will focus on holistic social causation.¹

It can be regarded as a characteristic feature of a philosophical problem *qua* philosophical that it is a problem what the problem really is. Given this, I would say that the problem of social causation is at least in part a philosophical problem. For one thing, it is not clear in the discussion of individualism versus holism and of the possibility of social causation what social properties (or events or states of affairs) as opposed to individualistic ones really are. I will below take the distinction between what is social—in a holistic, macrosocial sense involving irreducible social wholes—and what is individualistic to be related to the “we-mode” perspective or conceptual framework versus the “I-mode” perspective (framework).² The we-mode is holistic (but in a sense compatible with the causal primacy of individuals) and the I-mode is individualistic. These frameworks concern concepts and principles rather than anything directly ontological while of course the holism-individualism debate basically concerns ontological matters. I will speak of predicates and concepts (concepts being predicates with meaningful uses) and also of what properties these predicates express or purport to express—even if social properties are mostly (but not invariably) collectively man-made.³

Given that sense can be made of holistic social predicates and individualistic predicates and what they express, one needs to say something about causality and about causal laws that can be used for explanation of relevant singular happenings (and facts) and possibly regularities of them.⁴ Laws are here taken to be ontological, i.e. they are connections between

real, actual and possible, events or facts. A law can in a simple paradigm case be formulated by means of a sentence of the kind “In circumstances C, if A occurs then so necessarily does B (or probably does B)”, where A and B represent kinds of events or facts. If a law exists, then a sentence of the above kind will be true and support relevant “robustness” conditionals such as: “If A had occurred in circumstances C, then B would have occurred (or would probably have occurred)”. I take it for granted that citing causes is explanatory in general. Yet I will not say much about the nature of causes and causal laws in this paper—but will largely rely on common sense examples and paradigm cases. I take these kinds of cases nevertheless to give a “pro tanto” (or “prima facie”) reason for the existence of causal laws.⁵ My main thesis in this paper is simply this:

(GC) There are cases of irreducible holistic social causation and hence of explanation based on a cause-expressing holistic social explanans.

I take this thesis to involve the related theses that there are irreducible social facts and that these facts can cause other phenomena. (GC) This is compatible with the kind of ontological individualism that individual agents are the sole ultimate causal initiators or ultimate sources of causation in the social world. This kind of ontological individualism I find plausible but cannot here use the space to argue for it.

I claim that in generalized form causal relations yield social causal laws fit for explanatory uses. Accordingly, A backing law account is tentatively used in the paper, but not needed for the main argument. If the backing law account is tenable, macrosocial laws (perhaps only tendency laws) exist.

II INDIVIDUALISTIC VERSUS HOLISTIC PREDICATES AND CONCEPTS

Below I will say briefly what I take individualism and holism to involve. My approach will mainly be formulated for predicates (thus concepts, taking concepts to be predicates with meaningful uses) but I will also speak of individualistic versus holistic attitudes and actions.⁶ As the individualism-holism distinction antecedently is not very clear and as different theoreticians have understood the distinction in different ways, some amount of stipulation is necessary here. Accordingly, I will speak of *individualistic predicates* or briefly *I-predicates* and take them to express attitudes, actions, etc. of individuals. (A subset of these predicates will be *I-mode* predicates, to be explained and discussed later.) Derivatively we may speak of I-attitudes and I-actions as attitudes and actions to which the relevant I-predicates apply.⁷

I-predicates are taken to be property-expressing predicates that refer to individuals' psychological or (broadly) physical properties of the kind that do not refer to, or conceptually presuppose, social group concepts. Thus institutional concepts are excluded. Simple noninstitutional attitudes (that may be relational) are covered, and the same goes also for simple joint and collective actions. In brief, individualistic predicates, I-predicates, then are monadic or relational predicates that do not conceptually rely on social group predicates.

In general terms, a holistic social predicate, termed an *S-predicate*, on conceptual grounds applies either to a social "whole" like a social group or to group-based attitudes and actions (including joint actions) that conceptually presuppose social wholes. Accordingly, to be group-based an attitude or action must conceptually entail at least the collectively accepted or believed existence of a social group (broadly understood). S-predicates will not be fully characterized here because my task in this paper is to argue only for an existential claim, and this can be done by means of a subset of holistic social predicates, the subset consisting of "we-mode" predicates. Thus, I will concentrate on we-mode we-thinking and its features and claim that it involves S-features that require S-predicates for expressing them. Roughly, such we-thinking involves a group's and its members' thinking and reasoning in terms of the thick, "togetherness" notion of "we" about attitudes, actions, and emotions attributable (in my view only somewhat non-literally) to a social group and its members. S-predicates in the sense meant here are irreducible to I-predicates—I will comment on this matter later in the paper.⁸ I will also argue that they are needed for the best description and explanation of the social world. Thus there is much point in concentrating on the full-blown kind of sociality that the present subset of S-predicates involves.⁹

Let us consider a "we-intention" as an example of a we-mode we-attitude.¹⁰ Suppose we, a group of people, share the we-intention, thus have the joint intention, to clean up a park (X). Linguistically expressed "We share the we-intention to perform X as a group". Such a we-intention of a participant entails the existence of the joint intention by the participants to do X as a group.¹¹ So the participants must mutually believe or accept that they form a group and thus the notion of a social group is presupposed by the full-blown joint intention notions. The participants are assumed to have identified themselves with the group in question and thus made a "togetherness-we" apply to it. From the group's point of view, the action concept X must be a concept understood by the members, and, in our example, also the existence of the park must be assumed by them.

Here is an important ontological point: Such central social notions as that of an institution are socially constructed *for the group*. Roughly and concisely, an institution exists for the group only if it is constructed and taken by the group to exist. What the existence of an institution thus involves is based on the group's "intentional horizon". The existence of a social institution and related notions (like that of a full-blown social group capable of action) is quasi-objective but collectively mind-dependent. Institutional concepts do not get more objective than that: Macro-social entities and properties exist in the appropriate sense if and only if they are collectively constructed and brought about by the group members, and here the appropriate sense involves the use of S-predicates and existence for the group. Non-social notions such as that of a mountain are not similarly constructed. Yet, when this notion occurs in the intentional context of a collective attitude such as a joint intention, it must be taken by the participants to exist, i.e. to exist for them, for their use and to comply with their interests.

In general, we-mode predicates and concepts express group-based attitudes and activities defined by the notion of functioning as a group member and should thus be understood as S-predicates. To take an example, a group may have accepted a group goal for itself (e.g. "G is our group's central goal"). Accordingly, the group members ought, because of their membership, to function in the right way which involves that they respect and promote the achievement of the group goal. This entails (at least for normal cases) that they ought to adopt the group goal as their personal goal (but not necessarily as their "private" goal, one that is not grounded in the group's goal at all). Thus each agent here has a we-mode goal (the group's goal, an S-goal) and may have the goal also as his private goal (I-goal).¹² The S-goal constitutively depends on the group goal and may differ from (and even conflict with) a member's relevant private, I-goal.

The core of the we-mode being to function as a group member, all mental attitudes and actions that are constitutively involved in the we-mode qualify as holistic, S-features. This is the member-level sense of the we-mode—and it is worth recalling that single group members can (and indeed generally ought to) personally have such S-features (e.g. we-intentions, given that the others have or can be expected to have them). The we-mode involves these three central ideas on the member level: (1) authoritative group reason (e.g. a collectively accepted or a leader-determined group goal might be one), (2) collectivity condition (intuitively, that the members are in the same boat due to their construction of the group goal), and (3) collective commitment (the members' group-based bond to the goal).¹³

The macro sense of the we-mode concerns social groups as functional and constructed group agents (we-mode groups) and their characteristics (e.g. attitudes and actions). From a conceptual point of view, but strictly speaking not ontologically, we-mode groups are (extrinsically but not intrinsically) intentional group agents. They are real social systems that can function in ways resembling the functioning of individual agents.

The "switch" from the I-mode to the we-mode (that is holistic and is based on the notion of a group) is sometimes factually possible and it involves both a change of agency from individual agents to collective (quasi) agents and a change of I-thinking and acting to we-mode thinking and acting.

As to the notion of a we-mode group, it is assumed to commit itself to a group *ethos* (certain constitutive goals, beliefs, standards, norms, etc.) and to relevant we-reasoning and we-acting.¹⁴ A we-mode group always constructs itself as a group in a quasi-entifying sense and thus is an organized group capable of action as a group. In a we-mode group the members ought to act as group members and thus to identify with the group. (The above is in contrast to what needs to be the case in an I-mode group.)

Generally speaking, my ontological view about the social realm is both holistic and individualistic. It is holistic in the sense of requiring holistic entities like groups as irreducible social systems to exist. It is individualistic in the sense that *individual agents are "in the last analysis" the sole causal initiators* or ultimate sources of causation in the social world. There is derivative causation, e.g. the fact of people spending "too" much money on goods can be the cause of increase in inflation, etc.

III THE SOCIAL CAUSATION PROBLEM

Why is social causation seen as a problem? First, this is often connected to the belief that groups and social structures as superindividual entities are dubious entities especially from the point of view of their causal capacities if not otherwise. In my view we-mode groups exist as interactive social systems capable of producing uniform outcomes in the world and to do this intentionally in view of their members' activities as group members. A we-mode group does not ontologically exist as a full-blown intentional and mind-possessing agent (or person), although functionally or instrumentally it can be regarded as an agent. (An I-mode group of course is not usually viewed as an agent.)¹⁵ Second, social causation may argued against claiming that the only kind of causation there is in the real world at bottom is physical

(or, if you prefer another term, material) causation.¹⁶ As it often is put, the world is causally closed concerning physical causation. In the extensive debate on mental causation it has accordingly been argued that mental causation is epiphenomenal and that brain states and the behaviors they cause is all one can have concerning causation. What has been called the “exclusion argument” in effect says this in a precise, reasoned way.¹⁷ I will in this paper take for the granted existence of mental causation at least in some contexts and rely on my earlier discussion.¹⁸

As to social causation, the main problem has been the debate between holism and individualism concerning causation. Holism claims that social macroentities such as groups and social classes and their monadic and relational properties, e.g. relations of production between classes, cause people to act in certain ways. This can involve macrocausation, i.e. causation concerning macroevents or macrofacts, or it can involve the causation of individual action. In close analogy with the exclusion argument against mental causation one can formulate an argument saying that social causation is an epiphenomenon only and that (holistic) S-properties are causally impotent and that I-properties suffice for all causation in the social realm. I oppose this claim and allow that social systems can nonvacuously enter causal chains, although individuals in their we-mode (or some such) capacity are the central intentional initiators of causal chains.

The term “Social” in this paper expresses strong sociality, as defined earlier. Thus impotence argument is concerned with the most sense of “social”. I will not here take a precise stand on what exactly may be “social” without being “Social” (causal interaction between individuals gives examples of such non-holistic sociality). I take it that such weaker sociality has less chance of having causal powers and, in any case, if Social properties were causally impotent that would destroy the basic point of social causation, namely that groups and social structures can in some sense be causally relevant.

A person’s having a we-intention is an S-property of his—the concept of a we-intention being a holistic one, as claimed above. For instance, a we-intention does not reduce to private I-intention (and relevant I-beliefs, etc.) basically because it is based on the notion of a group reason in contrast to I-attitudes. As will soon be argued, social properties and hence property-expressing S-predicates are causally relevant and potent.

The main thesis of this paper says that there are real cases of irreducible holistic social causation and hence of explanation based on a cause-expressing social explanans. My proper

defense of this thesis will be given in Section IV, but below I will discuss some central claims needed for that defense. Let us thus consider the following central assumptions and claims related to a we-mode group G and to its action of causally bringing about something X (building a house or entering a treaty). Some of these have already mentioned in passing, but here is a somewhat more detailed presentation.¹⁹

(1) A we-mode group can only act (e.g. perform action X) if its members relevantly act in the we-mode. In other words, the group can act and causally bring about what X involves only vicariously, through its members' action (based on the group reason that G directs them to perform their parts of their performing X or, at least, to contribute to X). The group action supervenes on its members' relevant we-mode actions qua members: If a change from X to something else (e.g. not-X) at the group level occurs, then, given that the external circumstances "cooperate", there must be a relevant change at the member level we-mode actions. The truth of this supervenience claim follows from the fact that the members' we-mode properties (attitudes and actions) conceptually depend on their group's ethos-related properties. Accordingly, a group can perform an action X intentionally (in accordance with and because of its intention) if and only if its members acting in the we-mode qua members do it in cooperative external circumstances. In the case of group attitudes the group members' we-mode attitudes on conceptual grounds determine the relevant group attitude, while in the case of group action the determination is partly causal and depends also on the cooperativeness of the external circumstances. It can be noted that the discussed kind of supervenience claim need not hold relative to I-mode actions and attitudes. Thus the group can have a belief that most or perhaps all of its members do not have.²⁰

(2) In the present action context the group is indispensable. This is because the following conditional is true (partly because joint action must be based on a joint group reason in the we-mode case):

If G (due to its members' relevant activities²¹) had not decided (or, more generally, intended) to act (to perform X), then the members would not have performed X qua group members.

(3) (a) There can be token-cases of causation in the present action context, and on the type level there can presumably be non-strict laws such as expressed by the S-S or macro-macro law statement "For all we-mode groups G, if G intends to bring about X it tends to succeed, *ceteris paribus*".

(3) (b) We also get a causal connection to an individual member's part performance, which connection generally is lawlike (at least to the extent intentions have pro tanto nomic force): "For all we-mode groups G, if G intends to perform X, its members qua members tend to perform or at least try to perform their parts of X". While this conceptually still expresses an S-S law, "extensional-ontologically" its consequent concerns individuals' we-mode action, viz. the members' performances of their parts of X.²²

(3) (c) Furthermore, an individual member's intention to perform his part involves at least the causal connection that he generally succeeds in bringing about the right bodily movements required for his part performance to come about. This can be argued to involve a non-strict law between intentions (i.e. special kinds of proattitudes and commitments) and bodily behaviors, but at least in general not his full intentional performance of his part action (e.g. "intendings-in-action" or "willings" are part of the action and can only cause its behavioral movement component).

(4) We-mode groups function in a way that tends to produce more overall order into the social world than pro-group I-mode groups or pure I-mode groups. This will be argued in Section IV below. Accordingly, we-mode groups are indispensable also concerning the best results for the task of creating institutional order in society.

IV ARGUING FOR HOLISTIC SOCIAL CAUSATION

In this section I will argue for the existence of holistic social causation. I will first, in subsection A present an argument related to our earlier discussion of a group causally bringing about an event or state. After that I will argue in subsection B that in the case of rational group action we-mode group action and hence group causation will at least sometimes prevail over I-mode (i.e. individualistic) causation.

A. Suppose a fictional country Urbania (A) intentionally acts, e.g. boycotts (X) another country, say Ruritania. A country can act only if its government acts and thus only if suitable position-holders of the group act in the right way, say agree upon an action X. They form the joint intention or decision that A is to perform X, and let us assume that this decision is effected through suitable officials jointly or separately doing something Y that in the circumstances generates X, i.e. their action amounts to X (when the connection is purely conceptual or conventional) or it causally generates A's action X so that in each of these cases the operatives' actions can be said to have collectively generated X.

The general situation here is that agent A is a collective agent and action X is a collective action attributed to A. Thus we are clearly dealing with an S-fact, a macrosocial fact. Certain operative members of A acted suitably as group members, hence in the we-mode, and performed an action or set of actions that generates X. Here the we-mode activities are S-activities that presuppose the existence of the group, A, in question. Viewed from the acting group members' point of view, they must at least believe that they produced X when it was successfully intentionally collectively brought about by them. Such intentional performance of X depended on the members' shared we-intentions to perform it. These we-intentions and the relevant beliefs needed for carrying out them are also S-properties. They are of course not directly macrosocial properties but as they conceptually depend on the group they are indirectly macrosocial. We have here a rather trivial causal case of macro-macro causation or S-S causation: the group through its members activities intentionally causes some suitable X-related facts to take place in the world such that finally X (an S-feature) comes about.

There can of course be cases of unintentional causation as well. For instance, the boycott action X could for instance contingently lead to a new world war. That would be a collective S-phenomenon (that of course is not an intentional we-mode phenomenon). In such unintended causation the S-cause (the group's intention or decision) might also bring about lots of individual, non-collective consequences (e.g. personal misery to many people). This means that a macrosocial cause can also cause I-phenomena to occur (a case of S-I causation). Such S-I connections might be lawful and then we would in this case have a macro-micro law in an ontological sense. There may correspondingly also exist causal I-S connections—e.g. some I-mode properties might be causally relevant to people switching from the I-mode to we-mode thinking and acting.

B. In this subsection I will present an argument for the importance of S-causation and S-explanation that makes use of a recent mathematical result in game theory. I will also claim that this result gives a boost to the importance of collective goals for social explanation. As collective goals here are understood as goals that groups have they are S-features of the world and thus serve to justify the basic claim (GC) of this paper.

As I and my colleagues have recently argued, the best overall theoretical account of cooperation can be argued to require the we-mode approach—at least the we-mode approach often suffices for an account of cooperation and is strictly needed in some contexts.²³ Below I

will only sketch an especially important argument that relates to cooperation in a game-theoretic context.

Let me first mention the point that the switch to group thinking (esp. group agency and we-reasoning) together with the Paretian assumption will lead to group-rational mutual cooperation in e.g. the PD and Chicken, to High outcome in Hi-Lo, and other social dilemmas involving common interest and action-interdependence. To make my main point about holistic social causation and the creation of order in the social world, it suffices to focus on the simple Hi-Lo game. Consider thus the following payoff matrix:

	C	D
C	3, 3	0, 0
D	0, 0	1, 1

This Hi-Lo game (a coordination game without communication leading to binding agreement) has two equilibria, CC and DD, of which CC dominates over DD. Classical game theory (an I-mode theory) cannot recommend CC over DD, but group game theory can.²⁴ We note that this switch entails the choice of C for the group (that rationally takes C to dominate over D). This choice entails here that the members both choose C and thus cooperate.²⁵

By means of an adaptation of a game-theoretical theorem proved by Bacharach it can be shown that the pro-group I-mode (viz. the strong version of the I-mode where the members individually work for the group, sharing its utility function) and the we-mode, probabilistically construed concerning mode adoption, do not entail quite the same equilibrium behaviors.²⁶ This can be seen by comparing standard Bayesian games in which the players share the group's utility function (that each is trying to maximize individually) with games in which the players acting as a group try to maximize (expected) group utility in the we-mode sense (that is, by each selecting the best outcome in terms of group utility and then inferring their own part-actions). Even when the choices, utilities and the probabilities of the players acting for their own benefit instead of the group's benefit are the same, the resulting outcomes may differ. This is because the former case admits Pareto-suboptimal equilibria that will not be equilibria in the we-mode case. So, relating this to our present problem of holistic social causation, when a rational group (causally) produces a result that is an equilibrium—in the sense that no member has an incentive to deviate from the cooperative action in question—we have a case of collectively rational holistic causation.

An I-mode group may also produce the same result, because all group-based or we-mode equilibria also become I-mode equilibria, but not conversely. So what is the point here? We must take into account all the equilibria in the game and argue that holistic causation based on a collective or group goal produces more and better order into the social world than does I-mode causation. Note that in the case of we-mode causation a we-mode equilibrium expresses an explanatory group goal (or at least a joint outcome entailed by a group goal). This particular group goal gives the group members an authoritative reason to act as proper group members in the situation. Accordingly, the we-mode approach does not allow participants functioning properly as group members to defect (while the I-mode approach under discussion does allow it). To take a simple example, in the Hi-Lo game also the DD (or low-low) outcome will qualify as kind of fallback solution (equilibrium) in the individualistic Bayesian game but not in the we-mode game involving maximization of (expected) group utility. Thus it is always possible rationally to free-ride when an individualistic perspective is assumed.

To elaborate further on collective goals or, rather, group goals (which are S-properties), a we-mode group can adopt the mutual cooperation goal as its group goal or at least adopt a goal that entails the mutual cooperation joint outcome, e.g. CC in a Hi-Lo or in a PD. In real life terms, group goal might be e.g. to build a bridge together or to see to it that a bridge be built for the use of the group. In an ideal we-mode group, the group goal proximately explains at least the members' participation and in some cases (e.g. prior goal) also the joint action, and this explanation is basically causal in its nature.²⁷ Participation in the building is normatively governed and sanctionable action in the context of a we-mode group context, we assume. In the I-mode case, including the pro-group I-mode case where the members are only privately committed to the shared I-mode group goal of building a bridge, it is rationally possible to free-ride. Shared private goals of this kind are individual or I-goals in the terminology of this paper, whereas (shared) we-mode goals are S-goals.

To repeat, the present mathematical result means that the we-mode approach is capable of creating more collective (i.e. group-level) order than is the (pro-group) I-mode approach and gives a better explanation of cooperative member behavior. This gives a strong argument for the need for irreducible S-properties that may be causally active in cases of a group performing an action and thus causally bringing about an outcome as a group.²⁸

V CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS AND ARGUMENTS

In this paper, it has been assumed that holistic social notions and theorizing concern not only macroentities like groups (small social groups, organizations, states) and their properties (group action, social movements, relations of production, etc. but also members of such groups and their properties based on their acting in group contexts qua group members.

My discussion in the paper has given reasons to say that the following claims are tenable:

(i) There is (or at least can be) causation in which an S-phenomenon causes another S-phenomenon.

(ii) There is (or at least can be) causation in which an S-phenomenon causes the occurrence of an I-phenomenon (and perhaps also genuine cases of I-S causation can be found).²⁹

The cause here might be an inus cause (or a probabilistic inus cause), because several alternative sets of group members can cause the type of event in question (viz. X). This is partly because the group A diachronically need not have fixed members. It can, for instance, produce X at time t_1 through one set of operative members and at t_2 (say one hundred years later) through another set of members. These members' we-intentions will produce X, we can assume, and thus we have several disjunctive sets consisting of single-member we-intention (etc.) conjunctions such that each conjunction is sufficient (or sufficient given the cooperation of "Mother nature") for X. Furthermore the causation is aspectual, or "qua-causation".³⁰ E.g. in (i) a phenomenon (e.g. some people sharing a goal) conceptualized as an S-phenomenon (when in the example the goal is had in the we-mode) causes some activity conceptualized as group-based we-mode activity (rather than conceptualized shared private, I-mode action).

In accordance with above, it can be argued that the we-mode frame or perspective is not at least a priori reducible to the I-mode or individualistic perspective consisting only of I-properties in our present classification.³¹ Given this, we have:

(iii) S-causes (and S-causation) are not reducible to I-causes (and I-causation).

We also noted that there

Furthermore, S-causation and a fortiori causal explanation are not in general "replaceable" by I-causation and I-explanation at least in the following explanatory sense:

(iv) The we-mode account that can be regarded as a kind of holistic social theory or, perhaps better, framework for factual theorizing and theory-formation, which gives or at least can give a better overall account of social explanation at least in group contexts (that is, in contexts where a group is acting qua a group) than a rival theory employing only I-mode concepts, viz. referring only to I-predicates.

(v) The points made in (i), (ii), and (iii) show that there is holistic social causation in the and that there as a consequence are explanatory connections (i.e. extensional-ontological S-S, S-I, I-S connections) that cannot be captured by the individualistic conceptual framework. In the same tenor, (iv) shows that when people think, reason, and act in group terms (i.e. in the we-mode) more order in the world is created than what the individualistic explanatory framework is able to create. This kind of order can be properly explained only in terms of an approach making serious use of group notions and group thinking.

Nevertheless, the points (i) – (v) are compatible with *agency individualism*, the view that the only ultimate causal entities and, so to speak, “motors” in the social realm are individual human beings (let us not here play philosophical games with robots, apes, Martians, etc.). There may be changes in the social world that function as pro tanto causes (say revolutions or breakdowns of financial systems) but the ultimate explanatory motors “behind” them clearly seem to be human beings.*

* I am grateful to Kaarlo Miller for detailed comments on a version of this paper.

Notes

¹ However, I will make use of some of my discussion on mental causation in an earlier paper of mine see Raimo Tuomela, “A Defense of Mental Causation”, *Philosophical Studies* 90, 1998, pp. 1–34.

² See Raimo Tuomela, *The Philosophy of Sociality: The Shared Point of View*, New York: Oxford UP 2007.

³ See Raimo Tuomela, *The Philosophy of Social Practices: A Collective Acceptance View, op. cit. and The Philosophy of Sociality: The Shared Point of View, op. cit.* for my account of what the man-made character of social facts involves.

⁴ I take it that the more general formulation here is given in terms of facts rather than events and that event-talk can be formulated in terms of fact-talk.

⁵ I do not object to using the term ‘law’ alternatively to refer to a linguistic entity, i.e. the description of a law in the ontological sense. In this paper, however, the primary use is the nonlinguistic use.

⁶ A predicate is a linguistic entity, and it may express extralinguistic things like properties (as universals or as e.g. tropes) or sets of entities. One may also want to say that a predicate can express a concept. Here my line would be to say that predicate *uses* are concepts and that a predicate in this sense expresses a concept.

⁷ Relevance here means that the content of the attitude or respectively action is expressed by the predicate in question.

⁸ In my recent book I argue for such irreducibility of some social concepts and what they express—see Raimo Tuomela, *The Philosophy of Sociality: The Shared Point of View, op. cit.*, Chapter 4.

⁹ The notions in this paragraph and below have been discussed in Chapter 8 of Raimo Tuomela, *The Philosophy of Sociality: The Shared Point of View, op. cit.*. Especially the so-called CAT thesis of collective sociality is central here.

¹⁰ There are also I-mode we-attitudes, but I will not here consider them.

¹¹ We must distinguish between an intention attributed to a group agent, a joint intention that its members or some of them share, and a we-intention that a group member qua a group member has. Group intentions ontologically rely on joint intentions which in turn involve the members shared we-intentions

¹² To put the matter differently, the agent may have a goal that for him is both a goal in the we-mode and in the I-mode.

¹³ See Raimo Tuomela, *The Philosophy of Sociality: The Shared Point of View, op. cit.* and Raimo Tuomela, “Group Thinking”, ms 2009, for discussion.

¹⁴ Every we-mode group has an ethos. Even when you and I spontaneously lift a table together we form a possibly transient group with an ethos constituted at least by the joint goal (and the dyad’s goal) to lift the table together.

¹⁵ I have discussed the ontology of social groups in Chapter 6 of Raimo Tuomela, *The Philosophy of Sociality: The Shared Point of View, op. cit.* and in Raimo Tuomela, “Group Thinking”, *op. cit.*

¹⁶ At least in some interesting cases of causation, whatever its specific content (e.g. physical or social), a cause realizing a system’s causal power and expressing its causal potency can be regarded a cause in the sense of being an INUS condition for the effect, e.g. of the outcome of an action X (perhaps relative to suitable background conditions). An INUS condition, as explicated by John Mackie, J., *The Cement of the Universe: A*

Study of Causation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974, p. 62, is an *insufficient* but *non-redundant* part of an *unnecessary* but *sufficient* condition of X.

¹⁷ For the epiphenomenalism and exclusion arguments see Robert Van Gulick, “Who’s in Charge Here? And Who’s Doing All the Work?,” in Heil, J. and Mele, A. (eds.), *Mental Causation*, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1993, pp. 233-256.

Oxford, pp. 233-256. Also see the discussion in Raimo Tuomela, “A Defense of Mental Causation”, *Philosophical Studies* 90, 1998, pp. 1–34.

¹⁸ See Raimo Tuomela, “A Defense of Mental Causation”, *op. cit.*

¹⁹ See Raimo Tuomela, *The Philosophy of Sociality: The Shared Point of View*, *op. cit.*, especially chapters 4-6, for a defense.

²⁰ This is by now generally acknowledged in the literature. See Raimo Tuomela, *The Importance of Us: A Philosophical Study of Basic Social Notions*. Stanford: Stanford University Press 1995 and Raimo Tuomela, *The Philosophy of Sociality: The Shared Point of View*, *op. cit.*. One of my examples for showing this is: The Communist Party of Ruritania believes that capitalist countries will soon perish but none of its members really believes so.

²¹ Groups cannot function without their members functioning appropriately. But there are myriad ways in which a group intention can come about, e.g. via its authorized leaders’ or via its members’ spontaneous (or perhaps quarrelsome and tedious) collective acceptance.

²² In a sense we here have a macro-micro law, as it connects a group’s functioning with its members’ functioning, but note that in my account an I-property does not occur in the law and thus the law after all is an S-S law rather than an S-I law. One might try to argue that non-actional bodily movements yet are I-properties rather than S-properties (or are both, the S/I distinction not making sense here), but, in contrast, a bodily movement might still be taken to satisfy earlier group-basedness definition of an S-property. I will leave this matter unresolved here, as my point about actions as a group member that we have in the consequent of the law still undoubtedly are relevantly group-based and hence S-properties.

²³ See Raimo Tuomela, *The Philosophy of Sociality: The Shared Point of View*, *op. cit.*, esp. Chapter 7, and Raul Hakli, Kaarlo Miller, and Raimo Tuomela, “We-Thinking”, submitted to *Economics and Philosophy*, 2009. As recent experimental work shows the we-mode approach, or the experimenters say the “team reasoning” approach is empirically feasible in collective action dilemmas—often most experimental subjects operate on the basis of their we-thinking and cooperate in such dilemmas. (See Andrew Colman, A., Briony Pulford, and Jo Rose, “Collective Rationality in Interactive Decisions: Evidence for Team Reasoning”, *Acta Psychologica* 128, 2, 2008a, pp. 387-397, and Andrew Colman, A., Briony Pulford, and Jo Rose, “Team Reasoning and Collective Rationality: Piercing the Veil of Obviousness”, *Acta Psychologica* 128, 2, 2008b, pp. 409-412.

²⁴ See Michael Bacharach, “Interactive Team Reasoning: A Contribution to the Theory of Co-operation”, in: *Research in Economics* 53, 1999, pp.117-147 and Michael Bacharach, *Beyond Individual Choice*, Princeton: Princeton UP 2006.

²⁵ The collective Payoff Dominance principle falls short of having the same explanatory power as group game theory. See Raul Hakli, Kaarlo Miller, and Raimo Tuomela, “We-Thinking”, *op. cit.* for discussion.

²⁶ See Theorem 2 in Michael Bacharach, “Interactive Team Reasoning: A Contribution to the Theory of Cooperation”, *op. cit.*

²⁷ It is also teleological, indeed I have in my earlier work developed and defended a “causal-purposive” account of action causation, see Raimo Tuomela, *Human Action and Its Explanation*. Dordrecht: Reidel 1977, and *A Theory of Social Action*. Dordrecht: Reidel 1984.

The notion of purposive causation that I also applied to cases of joint action is similar to the later developed notion of intentional causation in John Searle, *Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1983.

²⁸ For other kinds of arguments for S-goals over I-goals, see Tuomela Raimo Tuomela, *The Philosophy of Sociality: The Shared Point of View*, *op. cit.*, Chapters 2 and 7-9. The present functional advantage of we-mode groups over I-mode ones also makes it possible to give an evolutionary argument for the development of we-mode “psychology.”

²⁹ Note that the “can be” versions of (i) and (ii) of course are weaker than (GC)

³⁰ This is my terminology in Raimo Tuomela, “A Defense of Mental Causation”, *op. cit.*

³¹ See Raimo Tuomela, *The Philosophy of Sociality: The Shared Point of View*, *op. cit.*, Chapter 4, for my central argument.