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The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective---An ESF Research Networking Programme

Final Report of the joint workshop of Teams A (“Formal Methods”), D (“Physical Sciences”) and E (“Foundational and Methodological Debates”); October 19-20, 2009, Utrecht University (Woudschoten Conference Centre, Zeist, The Netherlands)

1. Summary

The joint workshop of Teams A, D and E of the ESF Programme “The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective” took place in Zeist (The Netherlands) on Monday 19 and Tuesday 20 October 2009. The workshop comprised eight sessions, each consisting of 4 talks plus discussion. Of these eight sessions, six were devoted to specific questions in the scientific disciplines of the individual Teams; two sessions were interdisciplinary and focused on areas of overlap and joint interest between Teams A and D and Teams A and E, respectively. The workshop was concluded by a plenary lecture on Tuesday evening, given by Patrick Suppes. This brought the total number of papers presented at the meeting to thirty-three.
The qualitative level of the presented papers was very high. Together, these papers gave an excellent overview of the state of the art in the subjects of the three participating Teams; moreover, several new approaches and novel results were presented. Perhaps even more importantly, the talks raised much interest also from other team members and non-ESF participants. The discussion following each of the presentations was animated in a more than usual way and chairmen had a hard time keeping to the time schedule (in which they succeeded very well nevertheless).

It was very satisfying to see that a substantial audience attended and that not only Team members participated in the discussions: the announcement of the workshop had attracted a substantial number of students and young scholars, from The Netherlands but also from other European countries. The total audience (at the plenary lecture almost one hundred people attended) showed a very good balance between seasoned scholars and young researchers.
The idea to accommodate the participants in one conference centre, thus having hotel rooms, joint dinners, drinks, breakfasts etc. on the same premises where the lectures were taking place proved to be very successful. Discussions automatically continued after the official session times, over dinner and during drinks. Moreover, there was ample occasion for forging new contacts between scholars from different European countries and from different disciplines; this proved highly efficient.

At the same venue, on October 21st, a Steering Committee meeting of the ESF Programme took place. Among other things, it was agreed here to publish Proceedings of the joint workshop (together with the Proceedings of the B and C workshops of the Programme), and to organize a similar joint workshop (this time of Teams B and D) in London in 2010.

 

2. Scientific Content

Team A
The two sessions specific to Team A revolved around two topics: recent progress in confirmation theory and scientific realism in connection with explanation. Gregory Wheeler started by addressing the relation between confirmation and coherence, and demonstrated that many puzzles that are presently discussed in this field can be solved if the causal structure of the propositions in question is taken into account. Jon Williamson then showed how an objective Bayesian account of confirmation can be defended. Addressing an old problem in the work of Carnap, Williamson showed how this problem can be solved taking new formal developments into account. Jan-Willem Romeijn’s contribution (not personally presented) clarified the meaning and empirical content of statistical hypotheses, employing Von Mises' conception of probability; and sketched soundness and completeness proofs for Bayesian statistical inference on the basis of the convergence theorems by Gaifman and Snir. Finally, Franz Dietrich offered a fascinating new approach to decision theory, or rather an alternative to traditional decision theory. The key idea of his approach (jointly developed with Christian List) is that the reasons that underlie a decision have to be taken considered.

The second session of Team A focused on the discussions surrounding scientific realism and explanation. These two debates are strongly interrelated and the goal of this session was to further explore these connections and to make formal developments concerning explanation useful for the realism debate, which is central in present-day philosophy of science. The session was opened by a lively exchange between John Worrall and Stathis Psillos. While Psillos defends the claim that inference to the best explanation (IBE) has to be used in the No Miracles argument for scientific realism, Worrall opposed this view and defended the position that the No Miracles argument is at best a plausibility argument. One problem of this debate is that the type of inference called IBE is rather vague and so the second half of the session concentrated on formalizations of it. Here Adam Grobler presented a set-theoretical account and Joke Meheus showed how adaptive logics can be used to shed light on IBE.

Team D
The two Team D sessions focused on probability and the philosophy of time, respectively. The first session was opened by Klaas Landsman who argued that the recently developed topos-theoretic approach to quantum mechanics may be construed as an attempt to redefine truth along the Kripkean lines of listing possible worlds in which a given proposition holds. Carl Hoefer then addressed the important question of the relation between determinism and objective chanciness, which takes an especially acute form in the case of Boltzmannian Statistical Mechanics (BSM). Hoefer discussed the advantages and difficulties of a Humean/actualist account of probabilities in this context. After this, Dennis Dieks in his presentation objected to the common view that only quantum mechanics, with its “indistinguishability of particles”, can provide a fully satisfactory solution of the Gibbs paradox. He argued that analysis of the paradox rather supports the notion that particles are always distinguishable; moreover, that the universally accepted notion that identical quantum particles are indistinguishable rests on a confusion about what exactly quantum particles are. Finally, Anouk Barberousse investigated the distinction between two criteria according to which a numerical value can be said to be approximate: exactness and precision. A more precise approximation is not always a better approximation, because it does not always help us to achieve a better explanation. Barberousse analyzed several reasons for this failure.

The second session started with a talk by Mauro Dorato, in which he analyzed recent attempts at introducing an objective present in Minkowski spacetime. The aim of these attempts is to accommodate our experience of the passage of time and our immediate awareness of a “now”. Dorato in particular criticized the notion of “Alexandrov” present, both on physical grounds and in view of recent insights concerning our psychophysical experience of the present. In the second talk Tomasz Placek nevertheless tried to make progress towards the introduction of a physical now, by proposing an objective notion of co-presentness. He showed that if some extra modal structure is added to Minkowski spacetime, an interesting relation of co-presence can be defined, leading to “nows” of possibly varying spatiotemporal extension. Placek also indicated how this approach can be generalized beyond special relativity. Henrik Zinkernagel then discussed a problem of cosmic time, relating to the emergence of classical structures during the evolution of the universe. If the universe is in principle quantum, how come that there are (apparently) classical structures now? In cosmology, an assumed gradual emergence of classicality is framed in terms of a cosmic time parameter associated with the standard FLRW model. In this talk Zinkernagel examined the physical foundations for setting up FLRW models, and argued that the very notion of cosmic time in such models is crucially dependent on a classical behaviour of the material constituents of the universe. Zinkernagel maintained that this threatens the quantum fundamentalist idea that the material constituents of the universe could be described exclusively in terms of quantum theory at some early stage of the universe. Finally, Jeremy Butterfield discussed and opposed “pointillisme”, i.e. the doctrine that a physical theory's fundamental quantities are defined at points of space or of spacetime, and represent intrinsic properties of such points or point-sized objects located there. He focused on spatial extrinsicality: i.e. on what an ascription of a property implies about other places. The main idea was that the classical mechanics of continuous media (solids or fluids) involves a good deal of spatial extrinsicality---which seems not to have been noticed by philosophers, even those who have no inclination to pointillisme.

Team E
The theme for the two Team E solo sessions was “Historical Debates about Explanation, Prediction and Induction”. The first session began with Berna Kilinc exploring Kant’s response to Hume’s famous challenge to the validity of induction. Kilinc started from a recent contention in the literature that gave an ontological twist to Hume’s ideas. She proposed a new interpretation of Hume’s position and their relation to Kant’s philosophy. Elisabeth Nemeth then gave a paper on the strategy by means of which Edgar Zilsel sought to argue for the need for causal explanation. As she made clear, the pertinent questions were of fundamental importance to Zilsel, and relate directly to his later groundbreaking work in the history of science.  After this, Michael Stöltzner dealt with the pre-history of Hans Reichenbach’s pragmatic turn.  Stöltzner focused on three phases preceding the publication of Experience and Prediction in 1938: 1915-1920, the mid-1920s and the early 1930s.  He argued that Reichenbach’s reliance on a priori principles was overcome only in 1938 when prediction, the laying of wagers, was declared the only way to take the future into account: if there is a limit, then the principle of induction leads us to it. Artur Koterski then gave a paper which chronicled Karl Popper’s response to Otto Neurath’s criticism of his Logik der Forschung in his review in Erkenntnis in1935.  Following Lakatos, Koterski distinguished four stages: the “dogmatic” Popper, the “naive” Popper, the “sophisticated” Popper and Lakatos’ own methodology of scientific research programmes (MSRP), each of whom is confronted with Neurath’s criticism of falsification as dispensing with inductive reasoning of any sort. 

In the second session Friedrich Stadler started with a paper that analyzed the methodological debate in the 1890s between the German historians Karl Lamprecht, Georg von Below and Friedrich Meineke.  The former had argued for the need to employ historical laws in historical explanation, a contention vehemently opposed by the latter two and the historical profession generally. Stadler argued that this must be understood as a clash of paradigms with Lamprecht’s naturalism challenging the assumption of German historicism which regarded man and society as a counterpart to nature, demanding a distinctive methodology with a focus on “great men” and nations. Thomas Uebel then investigated the claim by Ludwig von Mises that already in the methodological dispute in the 1880s between Gustav Schmoller, the head of the German Historical School, and Karl Menger, the founder of the Austrian School of Exact Economics the sharp methodological separation of the natural sciences form the human sciences (Geisteswissenschaften) was significant and that in the choice between these methodologies political values played an essential role. Eric Schliesser followed with a paper about the philosophical background of Milton Friedman’s seminal “The Methodology of Positive Economics” of 1953.  Schliesser took his start from arguments against the standard view that Friedman’s instrumentalist conception of economic theory derived from the then reigning orthodoxy of the logical empiricist or understanding of scientific theories or its Popperian variant.  To see its true origin, Schliesser argued, we need to follow hints given by Stigler in correspondence with Kuhn.  What we see then is not only that Frank Knight’s economics  department at Chicago did not regard their discipline as a mature and settled science until the mid-1950s, but also that their developing ideas were influenced by Continental social theorists like Max Weber through the mediation of Talcott Parsons’ Structure of Social Actiony. Finally, Gurol Irzik and Peter Spirtes presented an overview of the history of causal modeling, a topic so far neglected by historians of the philosophy of science.  Causal modeling has its origin in Sewall Wright’s “method of path coefficients”, developed in the 1920s and early 1930s and applied originally to genetics as an alternative to multiple regression analysis. In the late 1940s and the 1950s methods of causal modeling were developed and used more widely by economists; in the 1960s sociologists developed causal modeling as forms of causal inference for non-experimental research.

Joint session A-D
The joint session of Teams A and D further explored the role of probability in modern science, especially physics and its philosophy. Thomas Müller started by discussing the notion of probability in the context of a metaphysics comprising modalities. Generally speaking, there is a consensus that probabilities are graded possibilities; consequently, any framework involving probabilities has to presuppose some notion of possibility. Müller considered probability theory built upon two frameworks for branching possibilities: Prior-Thomason branching time and Belnap's branching space-times. Branching-time based probabilities resemble the well-known consistent histories in quantum theory. Branching space-time based probabilities are more general. In that framework, a spatio-temporal motivation for independence assumptions and for the Markov condition can be given; and an interesting variant of the common cause principle can be proved. Maximillian Schlosshauer then discussed the status of probability in quantum theory. Can the notion of quantum probabilities and their quantitative representation in terms of Born's rule be derived from considerations of the properties of entangled states, as claimed by Zurek? There appear to be flaws and hidden assumptions in Zurek's derivation, and Schlosshauer here presented additional challenges to Zurek's approach. In particular, he argued that the meaning and nature of the probabilities appearing in the derivation is insufficiently defined. In fact, the different steps of the derivation appear to embrace distinct probability concepts. Schlosshauer elucidated how we might salvage Zurek's basic ideas to build a conceptually more sturdy edifice that could lead to a satisfactory account of quantum probabilities and Born's rule as emergent from the bare quantum-state formalism. After this, Michiel Seevinck presented a new analysis of violations of the well-known Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH) inequality. Such violations have been frequently analyzed in terms of the conditions of Parameter Independence (PI) and Outcome Independence (OI). Usually it is said that it is violation of the latter condition (i.e., OI) that is responsible for the violation of the CHSH inequality, and it has been extensively argued by many philosophers that this is not an instance of action at a distance but of some innocent “passion at a distance”. However, upon closer scrutiny it turns out that a satisfactory analysis of this passion at a distance has not yet been given. Seevinck presented some significant novel results in his own analysis. Finally, Guido Bacciagaluppi discussed the role of decoherence effects in the transition to the classical regime of quantum mechanics. It is puzzling that decoherence is typically a time-directed phenomenon (one can intuitively think of it in terms of wavefunction branching), while classical mechanics is a time-symmetric theory. Building on previous work in which he had criticized the standard discussions of time symmetry in the decoherence literature, Bacciagaluppi here suggested a new way for approaching and perhaps resolving this puzzle.

Joint session A-E
The theme of the joint A-E session was “Probability, Confirmation and the History of Philosophy of Science”. The session was opened up by a talk of Maria-Carla Galavotti who pointed out “pragmatic attitudes” in the work of various contributors to the debate about the interpretation of probability. As Galavotti demonstrated, pragmatic influence can not only be found in the work of Ramsey and de Finetti, but also, for example, in the work of Reichenbach. This suggests that the study of the history of probability can be used as a case-study to further our understanding of the amalgamation of European Logical Positivism with the tradition of American Pragmatism. Graham Stevens then analyzed and evaluated the later Russell’s claim that scientific reasoning depends on non-demonstrable principles other than induction. Problematically, Russell claimed that these postulates are known by us.  Stevens argued that Russell’s attempt to answer the question of how they are known by reference to their biological origin in animal expectations remained unsuccessful even when the arguments he gave in Human Knowledge are supplemented by arguments from “Non-Deductive Inference”.  Therewith also shown to be false, however, is Russell’s related claim to have shown the limits of empiricism. Pierre Wagner discussed Carnap’s changing conception of confirmation theory, taking his start from Carnap’s distinction between two concepts of probability, statistical probability (typically associated with the frequency conception) and logical probability. Finally, Jan Sprenger presented a new measure of explanatory power, which builds on groundbreaking ideas of Kemeny and Oppenheim in the 1940ies on confirmation. Sprenger’s presentation was thus of historical as well as of systematic interest, and therefore ideal to close this highly inspiring joint session.

 

3. Results of the Meeting

One of the most important results of the workshop was the conclusion that although the three participating teams focus on subjects that at first sight are very different, there is in fact a fascinating area of overlap and common interest, and ample opportunity for joint projects. A connecting thread in almost all presentations was the concept of probability, which plays a central role in present-day discussions in formal epistemology, in the philosophy of the physical sciences, and in general methodological debates. For example, probability is central to current confirmation theory, which is part of formal epistemology; and the topics of confirmation and explanation are in turn central for the scientific realism debate, one of the main subjects in present-day general philosophy of science. As it turned out at the meeting, such topics can profit considerably from an intellectual exchange of scholars following different approaches. The sessions on confirmation and realism succeeded in bridging the gap between these fields and to shed new light on several questions. The talks inspired a lot of discussion and will probably initiate joint work. For example, Wheeler and Williamson are already collaborating in a funded project and will continue doing so. There are also interesting connections between the work of Wheeler and Hartmann which was discussed and which may eventually lead to a joint publication. The talks by Grobler and Meheus were followed by a fascinating discussion focusing on the relevance of the formal work for philosophical debates, and we hope that this will inspire publications in this direction. Similarly, rather technical issues having to do with probability in the physical sciences can benefit from philosophical and formal developments elsewhere, as it turned out in several very lively discussions. Thus, the interpretation of quantum mechanics, in particular Bohr’s position, appeared in a new light if related to developments in logic and the theory of reference (Landsman); statistical mechanics turns out to fit in very well with a Humean analysis of probability (Hoefer); traditional foundational debates about identity appear to be highly relevant for the concept of identical particles in quantum mechanics (Dieks); physical explanation and formal epistemological arguments seem closely related (Barberousse). An especially striking bridge between general foundational debates, formal considerations and the philosophy of physics was found to exist in the philosophy of time. In fact, Müller (Team A) and Placek (Team D) discussed essentially the same subject from two different directions, and Butterfield’s contribution related directly to analytical metaphysics. The discussions here gave rise to a new impetus and many new contacts were established.
Several significant new points of view and unexpected connections were also established concerning general philosophical questions. Galavotti very nicely illustrated the importance of the study of technical probability questions for an understanding of more general philosophical movements; and there were a number of highly suggestive historical studies that cast new light on methodological debates (Kilinc, Stöltzner, Stadler, Uebel, Irzik). These papers represent some of the strongest currently available scholarship in history and philosophy of science: technically highly competent and sensitive to subtle historical and philosophical factors that influenced the debates. They set the agenda for future research.

A special and emphatical mention should be made of some spectacular contributions by (very) young and upcoming scholars. Maximillian Schlosshauer and Michiel Seevinck established novel and surprising results concerning probability in quantum mechanics---these promise to attract a lot of future attention. Jan Sprenger introduced a new and promising approach to the formal theory of explanation that will certainly give rise to a lot of debate and follow-up work.

The foregoing was only an incomplete selection from the significant results of the meeting. According to the organizers, the most important success has been that the meeting succeeded splendidly in bringing together scholars, young and old, from all over Europe to discuss issues from the philosophy of science. Many new contacts were established, and a number of new collaborative projects were initiated. Thanks to the ESF for making all this possible.

PROGRAM

Monday 19 October 2009

12.00–14.00    Informal lunch

14.00–17.30    Afternoon parallel sessions, four talks of 30+15 min and a break

Session A1: Recent Work on Confirmation
Greg Wheeler: Coherence, Confirmation, and Causation
Jon Williamson: An Objective Bayesian Account of Confirmation
Jan-Willem Romeijn: Confirmation and Statistics
Franz Dietrich (joint work with C. List): A Reason-Based Theory of Rational Choice

Session D1: Probability, Determinism, Truth
Klaas Landsman (Nijmegen, external):  Probability and Truth in Quantum Mechanics
Carl Hoefer (Barcelona, external):  Can Boltzmannian Statistical Mechanical Probabilities Be Objective?
Dennis Dieks: The Gibbs Paradox Revisited
Anouk Barberousse:   The Mathematics of Approximation and Their Use in Explanation

Session E1:  Topics in History of Explanation and Induction
Berna Kilinc: Kant on Scientific Explanation
Elisabeth Nemeth: Zilsel’s Adoption of Mach’s Conception of Scientific Laws
Michael Stoeltzner: Development of the Pragmatic Justification of Induction
Artur Koterski: The Rise and Fall of Falsificationism

19.30               Dinner

Tuesday 20 October 2009

  9.30–13.00    Morning parallel sessions, four talks of 30+15 min and a break

Session A2: Explanation and Scientific Realism
John Worrall (LSE, external): The No-Miracles Argument: what argument?
Stathis Psillos: The Limits of the No-Miracles Argument
Adam Grobler: An Explication of the Use of IBE
Joke Meheus: Formal Logics for Abduction

Session D2: Recent Developments in the Philosophy of Time
Mauro Dorato: Can We Have an Objective Now in Spacetime Physics?
Thomas Placek: A Locus for “Now” – a Modal Perspective   
Henrik Zinkernagel: Cosmic Time and Quantum Fundamentalism
Jeremy Butterfield: Against Pointillisme: a Call to Arms

Session E2:  Foundational Disputes Revisited
Friedrich Stadler (Vienna, external): Historical Explanation in the Methodenstreit of the Historians
Thomas Uebel: Geisteswissenschaft in the Methodenstreit in Economics
Eric Schliesser (Leiden, external): The Stigler-Kuhn Correspondence and the Philosophical Prehistory of Prediction in Chicago Economics
Gürol Irzık and Peter Spirtes: A History of Causal Modelling

13.00–14.00    Lunch

14.00–17.30    Afternoon joint sessions, four talks of 30+15 min and a break

Session AD3: Joint Session of Team A and Team D: Quantum Probabilities
Thomas Müller (Team A): Probabilities in a Branching Framework
Maximilian Schlosshauer (Copenhagen, external): Quantum Probabilities from Entanglement?
Michiel Seevinck (Utrecht, external): Analyzing Passion at a Distance: Progress in Experimental Metaphysics?
Guido Bacciagaluppi (Team D): Further Thoughts on Stochastic Einstein Locality

Session AE3: Joint Session of Team A and Team E: Probability, Confirmation and the History of Philosophy of Science
Maria Carla Galavotti (Bologna; SC): Probability and pragmatism
Graham Stevens (Team E): Russell on Nondemonstrative Inference
Jan Sprenger (Tilburg, external; joint work with J. Schupbach): The Logic of Explanatory Power
Pierre Wagner (Team E): Carnap's Theories of Confirmation

18.30               Dinner

20.00–21.00    Closing talk: Patrick Suppes (Stanford, external): Neglect of Independence and Randomness in the Axioms of Probability

 

Participants

Dr. Mario Alai
Istituto di Filosofia
Universita di Urbino
Via Timoteo Viti 10
61029 Urbino
Italy
mario.alai@libero.it

Dr. Guido Bacciagaluppi
Department of Philosophy
University of Aberdeen
Old Brewery, High Street
Aberdeen AB24 3UB
U.K.
g.bacciagaluppi@abdn.ac.uk

Dr. Anouk Barberousse
IHPST (Institut d’histoire et de philosophie des sciences et des techniques)
Université Paris 1, Panthéon-Sorbonne
13 Rue du Four
75006 Paris
France
barberou@heraclite.ens.fr

Dr. Jeremy Butterfield
Trinity College
Cambridge CB2 1TQ
U.K.
jb56@hermes.cam.ac.uk

Prof. Dennis Dieks
History and Foundations of Science
Utrecht University
Budapestlaan 6
3584 CD Utrecht
The Netherlands
d.dieks@uu.nl

Dr. Franz Dietrich
London School of Economics
Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
U.K.
f.dietrich@lse.ac.uk

Prof.  Mauro Dorato
Department of Philosophy
University of Rome 3
Via Ostiense 234
00144 Rome, Italy
mauro.dorato@gmail.com

Dr. Vincenzo Fano
Istituto di Filosofia
Universita di Urbino
Via Timoteo Viti 10
61029 Urbino
Italy
vincenzo.fano@uniurb.it

Dr. Jan Faye
Department of Philosophy
Copenhagen University
Njalsgade 80-90
DK-2300 Copenhagen S
faye@hum.ku.dk

Prof. Maria Carla Galavotti
CIRESS
Department of Philosophy
University of Bologna
Via Zamboni, 38
40126 Bologna
Italy
mariacarla.galavotti@unibo.it

Dr. Adam  Grobler
Instytut Filozofii
ul. Katowicka 89, 45-061 Opole
Poland
adam_grobler@interia.pl

Prof. Carl Hoefer
Departament de Filosofia  
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona 
08193 Bellaterra, Barcelona  
Spain  
carl.hoefer@uab.es 

Dr. Girol Irzik
Visual Arts and Social Sciences,
Sabanci University,
Orhanli, 34956 Tuzla, Istanbul, Turkey
edenber@boun.edu.tr

Erik Jansen (MSc)
History and Foundations of Science
Utrecht University
Budapestlaan 6
3584 CD Utrecht
The Netherlands
E.T.Jansen@students.uu.nl

Dr. Berna Kilinc
Philosophy Dept.
Bogazici University
Felsefe Bolumu
34342 Bebek, Istanbul
Turkey
irzik@boun.edu.tr

Dr. Artur Koterski,
Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science
Faculty of Philosophy and Sociology
Maria Curie-Sklodowska University, Pl. MCS 5
20-031 Lublin, Poland
zlimn@hektor.umcs.lublin. pl

Mrs. Femke Kuiling
History and Foundations of Science
Utrecht University
Budapestlaan 6
3584 CD Utrecht
The Netherlands
F. Kuiling@students.uu.nl

Prof. Klaas Landsman
Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen
Chair of Mathematical Physics
Heyendaalseweg 135
6525 AJ Nijmegen
The Netherlands
landsman@math.ru.nl

Prof. Stephan Hartmann
Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science
Tilburg University
PO Box 90153
5000 LE Tilburg
The Netherlands
S.Hartmann@uvt.nl

Prof. Theo Kuipers
Faculty of Philosophy, Groningen University
Oude Boteringestraat 52
9712 GL Groningen
The Netherlands
T.A.F.Kuipers@rug.nl

Sebastian Mateiescu
History and Foundations of Science
Utrecht University
Budapestlaan 6
3584 CD Utrecht
The Netherlands
Z.S.Mateiescu@students.uu.nl

Prof. Joke Meheus
Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science
Universiteit Gent
Blandijnberg 2
9000 Gent
Belgium
Joke.Meheus@UGent.be

Dr. Thomas Mueller
Department of Philosophy
University of Utrecht
Heidelberglaan 6
3584 CS Utrecht
The Netherlands
Thomas.Mueller@phil.uu.nl

Dr. F.A. Muller
Faculty of Philosophy
Erasmus University
Burgemeester Oudlaan 50, H5-16
3062 PA Rotterdam
The Netherlands
f.a.muller@fwb.eur.nl

Dr. Elisabeth Nemeth,
Institute for Philosophy,
University of Vienna,
Universitaetsstrasse 7
A-1010 Vienna,
Austria
elisabeth.nemeth@univie.at.ac

Dr. Cristina Paoletti
Department of Philosophy
University of Bologna
Via Zamboni, 38
40126 Bologna
Italy
cristina.paoletti@unibo.it

Prof. Herman Philipse
Department of Philosophy
Utrecht University
Heidelberglaan 8
3584 CS Utrecht
The Netherlands
Herman.Philipse@phil.uu.nl

Prof. Tomasz Placek 
Department of Philosophy 
Jagiellonian University 
52 Grodzka 
31-044 Krakow , Poland
uzplacek@cyf-kr.edu.pl

Prof. Stathis Psillos
University of Athens
Department of History and Philosophy of Science
Panepistimioupolis
GR 157 71 Athens
Greece
psillos@phs.uoa.gr

Prof. Miklos Redei
London School of Economics
Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
U.K.
M.Redei@lse.ac.uk

Dr. Jan-Willem Romeijn
Faculty of Philosophy
University of Groningen
Oude Boteringestraat 52
9712 GL Groningen
The Netherlands
J.W.Romeijn@rug.nl

Fernanda Samaniega (MSc)
Faculty of Philosophy
Complutense University of Madrid
Ciudad Universitaria, 28040 Madrid
Spain
fernanda.samaniego@gmail.com

Dr. Eric Schliesser
Leiden University,
Philosophy Dept.,
PO BOX 9515,
Leiden, 2300 RA,
The Netherlands
nescio2@yahoo.com

Dr. Max Schlosshauer
FNU Postdoctoral Research Fellow
Niels Bohr Institute
University of Copenhagen
Blegdamsvej 17
2100 Copenhagen
Denmark
schlosshauer@nbi.dk

Vincent Schoutsen
History and Foundations of Science
Utrecht University
Budapestlaan 6
3584 CD Utrecht
The Netherlands
einniv@gmail.com

Dr. Michiel Seevinck
History and Foundations of Science
Utrecht University
Budapestlaan 6
3584 CD Utrecht
The Netherlands
m.p.seevinck@uu.nl

Geurt Sengers (MSc)
History and Foundations of Science
Utrecht University
Budapestlaan 6
3584 CD Utrecht
The Netherlands
geurtsengers@gmail.com

Dr. Jan Sprenger
Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science
Tilburg University
PO Box 90153
5000 LE Tilburg
The Netherlands
Email: J.Sprenger@uvt.nl

Prof. Friedrich Stadler,
Institut fuer Zeitschichte,
University of Vienna,
Universitätscampus,
Hof 1 Spitalgasse 2-4,
A-1090 Wien,
Austria
friedrich.stadler@univie.ac.at

Dr. Graham Stevens,
Philosophy, School of Social Science,
University of Manchester,
Manchester M13 9PL,
Great Britain
graham.stevens@manchester.ac.uk

Prof. Michael Stoeltzner
Department of Philosophy
University of South Carolina
Columbia, SC 29208
USA
stoeltzn@mailbox.sc.edu

Prof. Patrick Suppes
Center for the Study of Language and Information
Ventura Hall
Stanford University
Stanford, California 94305-4115
U.S.A.
psuppes@stanford.edu

Prof. Thomas Uebel,
Philosophy, School of Social Science,
University of Manchester,
Manchester M13 9PL,
Great Britain
thomas.uebel@manchester.ac.uk

Dr. Jos Uffink
History and Foundations of Science
Utrecht University
Budapestlaan 6
3584 CD Utrecht
The Netherlands
J.B.M.Uffink@uu.nl

Kees-Jan Schilt (MSc)
History and Foundations of Science
Utrecht University
Budapestlaan 6
3584 CD Utrecht
The Netherlands
C.J.Schilt@uu.nl

Dr. Janneke van Lith
Department of Philosophy
Utrecht University
Heidelberglaan 8
3584 CS Utrecht
The Netherlands
Janneke.vanLith@phil.uu.nl

Prof. Ilkka Niiniluto
P.O. Box 33 (Yliopistonkatu 4)
FI-00014 University of Helsinki
Finland
Ilkka.niiniluto@helsinki.fi

Kasper Schipper
History and Foundations of Science
Utrecht University
Budapestlaan 6
3584 CD Utrecht
The Netherlands
K.Schipper@students.uu.nl

Mrs. Marij van Strien
History and Foundations of Science
Utrecht University
Budapestlaan 6
3584 CD Utrecht
The Netherlands
M.E.vanStrien@students.uu.nl

Dr. Pierre Wagner
IHPST (Institut d’histoire et de philosophie des sciences et des techniques)
Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne
13 Rue du Four
75006 Paris
France
pwag@wanadoo.fr

Prof. Greg Wheeler
CENTRIA, Center for Artificial Intelligence
Department of Computer Science
The New University of Lisbon, FCT
2829-516 Caparica, Portugal
gregory.r.wheeler@gmail.com

Dr. Jon Williamson
University of Kent
Canterbury, CT2 7NF
UK
j.williamson@kent.ac.uk

Prof. Gereon Wolters
Department of Philosophy
University of Konstanz
D-78457 Konstanz
Germany
Gereon.Wolters@uni-konstanz.de

Prof. John Worrall
LSE
Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
UK
J.Worrall@lse.ac.uk

Leszek Wronski (MSc)
Department of Philosophy 
Jagiellonian University 
52 Grodzka 
31-044 Krakow , Poland
leszek.wronski@uj.edu.pl

Prof. Christian Wüthrich
University of California, San Diego
9500 Gilman Drive,
0119 La Jolla, CA 92093, USA
wuthrich@UCSD.EDU

Dr. Henrik Zinkernagel
Departamento de Filosofia
Edificio Facultad de Psicologia
Universidad de Granada
18071 Granada
Spain
zink@ugr.es

Dr. Sjoerd Zwart
Technische Universiteit Eindhoven
Postbus 513
5600 MB Eindhoven
The Netherlands
S.D.Zwart@tudelft.nl